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YOU GOTTA HAVE FAITH: GOOD FAITH IN THE CONTEXT OF 
DIRECTORIAL FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE FUTURE IMPACT 
ON CORPORATE CULTURE 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“The point is, ladies and gentlemen, greed is good.  Greed works, greed is 
right.  Greed clarifies, cuts through, and captures the essence of the 
evolutionary spirit.  Greed in all its forms, greed for life, money, love, 
knowledge, has marked the upward surge of mankind[,] and greed . . . will 
save . . . the USA.”1  These are the immortal words of Gordon Gekko, the 
corporate raider from the movie Wall Street whose insatiable greed eventually 
led to his fall from spectacular wealth to an equally spectacular demise.  Gekko 
represents the premier capitalist who reached his fabulous position in 
America’s elite through deceitful and illegal schemes.  Such a story is 
entertaining in the gleam of Hollywood, but what happens when reality mimics 
the movies? 
Over the past few years corporate scandals have rocked the very core of 
the American capitalist system and have raised many questions regarding 
proper corporate governance.  Everyone remembers the highly publicized 
financial scandals involving WorldCom, Qwest, Global Crossing, Tyco, and 
Enron, which ultimately cost shareholders $460 billion.2  However, these 
particular scandals represent only a small portion of the corporations that have 
been investigated for dishonesty and fraud.  In fact, since the Enron scandal 
broke in 2000, sixty-one companies have been investigated for their 
indiscretions.3 
Corrupt officials who looted their companies of assets and opportunities 
fueled many of these companies’ falls from the highest echelon of American 
corporations.  Meanwhile the companies’ boards of directors buried their heads 
in the sand, unwilling to prod into the destructive behavior of the top officials 
that was crippling the very company that shareholders had entrusted the 
 
 1. WALL STREET (Oaxatal Productions, Inc. 1987), available at http://allmoviescripts.com/ 
scripts/7622567143f65e0111fbe9.html. 
 2. See David L. Cotton, Fixing CPA Ethics Can Be an Inside Job, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 
2002, at B2. 
 3. See CITIZEN WORKS, THE CORPORATE SCANDAL SHEET, at http://www.citizen 
works.org/corp/corp-scandal.php.  THE CORPORATE SCANDAL SHEET provides a synopsis of each 
of the corporate scandals and the catalysts that caused them. 
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directors to monitor.  As a result, large numbers of employees lost their jobs 
and company shareholders lost hundreds of billions of dollars in wealth. 
There has been a marked shift within the courts during the past few years 
to focus on the good faith of corporate directors.  This shift is perhaps a direct 
corollary to the inappropriate directorial conduct that fueled the recent 
collapses of several Fortune 500 companies.  In recent cases, the court system 
has warned directors that such egregious conduct will not be tolerated and will 
expose the directors to personal liability. 
Originally, the duties of care and loyalty subsumed the duty of good faith.4  
However, Delaware and other states have recently enacted new provisions that 
have thrust the duty of good faith into the limelight as the central focus in a 
court’s fiduciary duty inquiry.  These provisions have substantially lessened 
the presence of directors’ fiduciary duties and the inherent potential exposure 
to personal liability.  However, an integral component within each of these 
protective statutes is the concept of good faith. 
Recent cases have made it clear that a lack of good faith will take a 
director’s conduct out of the protection of both the business judgment rule and 
the protective provisions.  The courts have put directors on notice that a lack of 
good faith will expose them to personal liability.  In addition, although not 
discussed in great detail in this Comment, the good-faith standard is a key 
component in the new Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the proposed listing 
requirements of self-regulatory organizations such as the NYSE and 
NASDAQ.5 
In addition to recent statutory developments in Delaware, the courts and 
Congress have also made efforts to enhance the scrutiny on director conduct.  
While some commentators have characterized such moves as a drastic shift in 
the way the legislative and judicial branches approach corporate conduct, these 
measures are more properly viewed as a wake-up call in response to the recent 
deplorable conduct of several directors and top officials that has recently come 
into the public consciousness.  Despite the increased scrutiny, the business 
judgment rule continues to drape a security blanket over business decisions, 
encouraging bold entrepreneurialism and risk-taking, a centerpiece for 
American business. 
This Comment will discuss the standards set forth in several landmark 
cases in the past fifty years such as Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing 
Co.,6 Smith v. Van Gorkom,7 Aronson v. Lewis,8 and In re Caremark 
 
 4. Arthur Fleischer, Jr. & Alexander R. Sussman, Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in Takeovers 
and Mergers, 1388 PLI/CORP 911, 918 (2003). 
 5. E. Norman Veasey, Policy and Legal Overview of Best Corporate Governance 
Principles, 56 SMU L. REV. 2135, 2144 (2003). 
 6. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
 7. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 8. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
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International Inc. Derivative Litigation.9  These cases show the evolution in 
director expectations and the good-faith principle that has led to the shift in 
focusing on directors’ good faith, which is evident in the recent cases of 
McCall v. Scott,10 In re the Abbot Laboratories Derivative Shareholders 
Litigation,11 and In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation. 12 
Ultimately, the goal of the array of new measures put into place in 
response to the recent corporate scandals is to increase the involvement and 
accountability of corporate directors.  Bill Donaldson, Chairman of the SEC, 
recently expressed the aspirations of Congress and the courts that “in the [end] 
it’s going to be the human characteristic” that regains trust in the corporate 
culture and the markets.13  In a recent article, Delaware Chief Justice E. 
Norman Veasey noted that directors are currently expected to be “skeptical, 
probe, ask questions, and put management to its proof.”14  Furthermore, Chief 
Justice Veasey articulates that a director must embody the qualities of 
“integrity, expertise, diligence, good faith, independence and professionalism” 
and maintain “a coherent economic rationale dedicated to the best interests of 
stockholders.”15 
This Comment is divided into five parts, the first of which will outline the 
business judgment rule and the fiduciary duties.  This section will demonstrate 
the deference that courts give to business decisions and the reluctance of the 
judiciary to second-guess directors’ judgment.  Secondly, the Comment will 
show the progression of the good-faith principle, both in the context of judicial 
analyses of fiduciary duty and through the enhanced scrutiny associated with 
takeovers.  Next, it will focus on three recent cases that applied the good-faith 
concept in taking director conduct outside the protection of not only the 
business judgment rule but also out of the safety of new exculpatory 
provisions.  Part Four will demonstrate how the focus on the good faith of the 
director is consistent with the purpose of the business judgment rule and how 
good faith promotes business by deferring to director decisions absent 
egregious conduct.  Finally, this Comment will focus on the potential impact 
that the good-faith analysis could have in future litigation and the corporate 
culture. 
 
 9. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 10. 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 11. 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 12. 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 13. Deborah Solomon, SEC Acts to Give Audit Panels More Power Over Accountants, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2003, at C5. 
 14. Veasey, supra note 5, at 2146. 
 15. E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the 
Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 445 (2003). 
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II.  THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND ITS EFFECT ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
The directors of a corporation are responsible for directing the 
management and affairs of everyday business.  These duties are an integral 
component in maintaining an effective and profitable company.  In many 
circumstances, directors face decisions that they are not intimately informed 
about, and have limited, if any, expertise.  These tough decisions, however, 
must be made in order for a business to prosper in the market and thrive 
against competition.  In such situations, directors will likely be called on to 
weigh the corporate policies and goals in making the most profitable business 
decision.16  A good director is generally one who can consider the needs of a 
business on one hand; the risks involved in meeting those needs on the other; 
and somehow create a viable balance of the two that will create a long-term 
strategy for the corporation to succeed.17  If a director fails to use the requisite 
care in making appropriate judgments in the best interests of the shareholder, 
she could be subject to a derivative suit brought by the disadvantaged 
shareholders. 
A. Shareholder Derivative Suits 
Shareholders have an important right to bring a derivative action on the 
company’s behalf to recoup assets from a director in retribution for any 
improper conduct.  When investors purchase stock in a company they gain 
contractual rights to ownership; however, they entrust the directors to make 
decisions in their best interest.18  One of the rights that a stockholder obtains 
when she invests in a corporation through stock purchase is the ability to bring 
a derivative suit against directors and officers on behalf of the corporation in 
the event of wrongdoing.19  The plaintiff must assert particular facts that show 
that a director breached his duties to the shareholder.20  A derivative suit 
differs from other types of suits because even if the stockholder qualifies for 
the privilege to litigate and ultimately wins the action, the award or equitable 
relief will not benefit the individual shareholder; it will benefit the 
 
 16. See E. Norman Veasey & Julie M. S. Seitz, The Revised Model Business Corporation 
Act: Comment and Observation: The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised Model Act, the Trans 
Union Case, and the ALI Project—A Strange Porridge, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1484 (1985).  
Such tough decisions could include “acquisitions, sales of assets, entrance into new lines of 
business, declaration of dividends, capital investment, incurring or avoiding debt, issuance of 
stock, [and] mergers.”  Id. 
 17. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
 18. See COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CORPORATE 
DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 3 (3d ed. 2001). 
 19. See DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF 
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 3 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1995). 
 20. Id. at 14. 
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corporation.21  The derivative action is a very important aspect in corporate law 
because most shareholder claims against directors take this form.22  A 
formidable defense against such actions involves the directors’ assertion that 
their actions are protected by the business judgment rule. 
B. The Business Judgment Rule 
Reluctance toward second-guessing business decisions dates back more 
than 250 years in English law to The Charitable Corp. v. Sutton,23 and the 
1829 Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Percy v. Millaudon24 instituted the 
business judgment rule in American jurisprudence.25  Inherent in any business 
decision is the assumption of risk, and the business judgment rule is a 
presumption that protects a director from personal liability in shareholder 
suits.26  The business judgment rule also shields directors in cases where a 
shareholder seeks an injunction against a decision.27 
Four points sum up the rationale and the necessity for the business 
judgment rule in corporate law jurisprudence.28  First, the courts recognize that 
even the most honest and well-intentioned director can make an improvident 
decision.29  Second, the courts recognize the inherent risk involved in business 
decisions; therefore, the rule alleviates the fear of judicial second-guessing and 
allows the directors broad discretion in making company policy.30  Third, the 
rule keeps courts from ruling on business decisions when they are less 
equipped to handle such decisions than the directors.31  Finally, the business 
judgment rule ensures that directors, and not shareholders, control the 
corporation.32 
The business judgment rule is basically an “uncodified equitable doctrine 
to be applied by the courts on a case-by-case basis.”33  Delaware incorporates 
the majority of corporations in the United States today; therefore, the Delaware 
court system has developed substantial familiarity with issues relating to 
 
 21. See id. at 710. 
 22. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). 
 23. 2 Atk. 400, 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch. 1742). 
 24. 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829). 
 25. BLOCK, ET AL., supra note 19, at 5. 
 26. Veasey & Seitz, supra note 16, at 1487. 
 27. Id. 
 28. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 7. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 7–8. 
 31. Id. at 8. 
 32. Id. at 10. 
 33. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 44.  The American Bar Association did attempt to 
codify the rule in § 8.30 of the Model Business Corporation Act; however, it noted that the 
court’s job was to “delineate the differences, if any, between that rule and the standards of 
director conduct.”  Id. at 44. 
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corporate affairs and governance.34  Accordingly, when looking for guidance 
on an issue regarding corporation law the first place to turn should be the 
opinions of the Supreme Court of Delaware.  One of the most classic and 
enduring articulations of the business judgment rule is the 1927 decision of 
Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp.35  The Supreme Court of Delaware 
expanded upon Bodell and has provided the most oft-cited expression of the 
business judgment rule as “a presumption that in making a business decision 
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in 
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.”36  If the conditions of the rule are met, the court will apply the rule 
and not substitute its judgment for that of the board unless a plaintiff can show 
that the directors breached their duties of care, loyalty, or good faith.37 
A number of cases show the deference that courts give to director 
decisions even when such decisions are imprudent.  One example is Kamin v. 
American Express Co.38  In Kamin, American Express acquired shares in a 
corporation for around $30 million, only to sell the shares three years later for 
$4 million.39  Instead of selling the shares on the open market at a loss, thereby 
reducing tax liability by $8 million, American Express decided to distribute the 
shares as a special dividend to shareholders to avoid the loss in net income.40  
The distribution to shareholders had the effect of forfeiting the opportunity to 
take the tax loss and could even be seen as wasting corporate assets.  The 
board, however, claimed that it was acting in the shareholders’ interests by 
keeping reported earnings high.41  Despite the obvious foolishness of the 
decision, the court upheld the directors’ ability to make an informed business 
decision without judicial judgment, as long as the decision had been made in 
good faith.42  The court refused to impose liability without a showing of self-
dealing, even if the directors had made a mistake, or, in hindsight, the 
 
 34. Id. at 2. 
 35. 140 A. 264 (Del. 1927).  The Bodell court articulates that the overall principle of the 
business judgment rule is that a business decision will not be reviewed by the courts as long as 
the acts of the directors “were performed in good faith, in the exercise of their best judgment, and 
for what they believe[] to be the advantage of the corporation and all its stockholders.”  Id. at 268. 
 36. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).  See also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 
A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000). 
 37. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); Emerald Partners v. 
Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001).  The Cede court was the first to speak of the directors’ 
fiduciary duties as a “triad,” which included a duty of good faith along with duties of care and 
loyalty.  Cede, 634 A.2d at 361. 
 38. 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). 
 39. Id. at 809. 
 40. Id. at 809–10. 
 41. See id. at 811. 
 42. Id. at 812. 
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shareholders would have preferred the directors to have taken a different 
course of action.43 
Although the courts have shown general deference to the decisions of 
directors, they have differed in their articulation of what actions would fall 
outside the rule’s protection.44  Some courts hold that no decision will be 
second-guessed unless the judgment was “tainted by fraud, conflict of interest, 
or illegality;” others say, “unless the alleged defect in the directors’ judgment 
rises to the level of fraud;” or, “unless it rises to the level of gross 
negligence.”45  Furthermore, courts have given certain board decisions, such as 
dividend policies, decisions regarding what products to manufacture, or 
personnel decisions, broad deference even beyond the generous boundaries of 
the business judgment rule and do not subject them to judicial review no matter 
how ill-advised.46 
Despite the obvious implications to the business community, the courts are 
quick to point out that the business judgment rule is a standard of judicial 
review and is not meant to be a standard of business conduct.47  The rule is not 
meant to be a guide for director’s conduct but instead serves as a defense 
against judicial scrutiny assuming directors follow certain conditions.48  A 
shareholder can rebut the rule in two ways, and the underlying notion is that 
directors will not be liable for their decisions unless they breached their duties 
of care or loyalty.49 
1. The Duty of Loyalty 
The first way a shareholder can rebut the business judgment rule is to show 
that a director made a decision specifically to further his own self-interest and 
not for the shareholders’ benefit.50  In a famous opinion, the Michigan 
Supreme Court pointed out that “[a] business corporation is organized and 
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”51  Directors are 
required to act, individually and as a group, in good faith and in the best 
 
 43. Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (holding 
that the board will not be held liable just because they “may be mistaken, that other courses of 
action might have differing consequences, or that their action might benefit some shareholders 
more than others . . . so long as it appears that the directors [were] acting in good faith.”). 
 44. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4 (1986). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, 
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1664 (2001). 
 47. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 3–4. 
 48. Id at 3. 
 49. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or 
Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 291 (1994).  Inherent in these fiduciary duties are the 
requirements for a disinterested director to act with reasonable diligence and good faith.  Id. 
 50. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 124. 
 51. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
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interests of the company, which is the duty of loyalty that is owed to the 
shareholders.52  The duty of loyalty imposes personal liability if a director uses 
his power for his own pecuniary benefit.53  At common law a transaction 
involving conflicts of interest was void or voidable.  Modern courts have been 
more lenient, but they still require the self-dealing director to act with the 
utmost good faith and scrupulous fairness.54  A director who has a financial or 
personal interest in a transaction must disclose her interest and all the relevant 
material facts to the board and then gain approval by a majority vote of 
disinterested directors.55  The duty of loyalty also requires that a director give 
the corporation a chance at a business opportunity before pursuing it herself.56 
If a board, or individual member, fails to satisfy one of these requirements, 
the director’s actions will be held to the more demanding review of the entire 
fairness test.57  The court will then require the board to show that the decision 
was a product of both fair price and fair dealing.58  The underlying principle of 
the duty is that a director cannot personally prosper at the detriment of the 
shareholders who have entrusted her with the well-being of the corporation.  In 
addition to the duty of loyalty, fiduciaries have a duty of care to the 
corporation and its shareholders. 
2. The Duty of Care 
The second alternative available to the shareholder is to show that the 
directors did not exercise sufficient care under the circumstances.59  The 
obligation to make prudent business decisions usually involves consultation 
with management and the strategic goals of the company.60  The directors owe 
 
 52. See COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, supra note 18, at 10.  The duty requires that the 
directors do not take advantage of the shareholders through fraudulent or unfair transactions.  Id. 
 53. Id.  The duty of loyalty can be divided into three subsections consisting of 1) interested 
director transactions, 2) usurpation of corporate opportunity, and 3) executive compensation.  
BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 126. 
 54. Most state statutes allow a transaction involving a conflict of interest if it is approved by 
a majority of disinterested directors or shareholders or if it is fair to the corporation.  See BLOCK 
ET AL., supra note 19, at 130–38. 
 55. COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, supra note 18, at 10–11. 
 56. Id. at 11.  Courts differ on the exact test to determine what constitutes a corporate 
opportunity and the steps an employee must take before taking the opportunity for herself; 
however, the bottom line is “that a corporate fiduciary should not serve both corporate and 
personal interests at the same time.”  Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146, 
1150 (Me. 1995). 
 57. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). 
 58. See id.; Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).  If the directors 
fail to prove the intrinsic fairness of the transaction, they could be liable not only to compensate 
the company and shareholders but also to rescind the transaction and pay damages.  BLOCK ET 
AL., supra note 19, at 17. 
 59. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 32. 
 60. COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, supra note 18, at 3. 
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a duty of care to the shareholders to act as a normally prudent person in the 
same position would in exercising decision-making and oversight functions.61  
The plaintiff must show facts to overcome the business judgment rule 
presumption, and the directors will be held personally liable if they cannot then 
prove that they exercised the requisite care.62  The Supeme Court of Delaware 
recently reiterated the applicable liability standard related to a director’s duty 
of care, which is “predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.”63 
The oversight function requires the directors to pay attention to the 
“corporate systems and controls, policy issues and other recurring matters, as 
well as discrete attention to matters suggesting a need for inquiry.”64  Directors 
are required to actively participate in company decisions and to properly 
inform themselves before making such decisions.65  In complying with this 
duty, they should gather information from management, corporate committees, 
or other experts employed by the company in advance to allow time for 
reflection on the information before making a decision.66  Furthermore, 
directors must ensure that compliance systems are in effect, and if they become 
aware of any problems, they must make further inquiry to ensure management 
is dealing with the problem appropriately.67  The duty of care requires a 
director to be intimately informed about the decisions and business practices of 
the company entrusted to her care.  Recently the courts have spoken about a 
duty of good faith and have inquired into a director’s good faith in their 
fiduciary duty analyses. 
III.  THE PROGRESSION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD FAITH IN THE BUSINESS 
JUDGMENT RULE ANALYSIS 
Historically, the director’s duty of good faith was “subsumed in a court’s 
inquiry into the director’s satisfaction of her duties of care and loyalty.”68  If 
the court found that the director did not satisfy one of those duties, there was 
no need to determine whether there also was a violation of the duty of good 
faith.69  Alternatively, if there was no breach of either of those duties it was 
 
 61. See id. at 8. 
 62. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 53–54. 
 63. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).  Gross negligence in the 
corporate context refers to “reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard” for stockholders’ 
interest or “actions which are ‘without the bounds of reason.’”  BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 
64–65 (citation omitted). 
 64. COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, supra note 18, at 3. 
 65. Id. at 8. 
 66. Id. at 8–9. 
 67. Id. at 9–10. 
 68. Fleischer & Sussman, supra note 4, at 918. 
 69. Id. at 985. 
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uncommon for courts to perform a separate inquiry on the issue of good faith.70  
However, as a result of relatively new statutes in corporation law, the duty of 
good faith has become an integral component in determining director liability 
in recent decisions.  The courts have also provided a definition of good faith as 
it applies to corporate governance. 
A. The Definition of Good Faith 
Several commentators have inquired into the definition of good faith and 
its practical significance in a court’s analysis.  A recent Delaware case cited 
the Black’s Law Dictionary definition for bad faith as “not simply bad 
judgment or negligence, but . . . the conscious doing of a wrong because of 
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; . . . different from the negative idea of 
negligence in that it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with 
furtive design or ill will.”71  Additionally, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
suggested that the 
good faith iteration’s utility may rest in its constant reminder (1) that a 
fiduciary may act disloyally for a variety of reasons other than personal 
pecuniary interest; and (2) that, regardless of his motive, a director who 
consciously disregards his duties to the corporation and its stockholders may 
suffer a personal judgment for monetary damages for any harm he causes.72 
More generally, the overall concept of good faith is found in the typical 
codification of director conduct, which requires a director to act with the 
honest belief that she is acting in the best interests of the corporation.73 
Accordingly, if directors act with this requisite good faith, courts still give 
deference to their decisions, and are reluctant to second-guess their judgment.74  
Several early cases laid the foundation for the good-faith principle that courts 
apply today in the corporate context. 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 624 A.2d 1199, 
1208 n.16 (Del. 1993) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 72 (5th ed. 1983)). 
 72. Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 48 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 73. Veasey, supra note 15, at 444–45.  A New York court described good faith as 
an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition. It 
encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence 
of a design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individual’s personal 
good faith is a concept of his own mind and inner spirit and, therefore, may not 
conclusively be determined by his protestations alone. 
Doyle v. Gordon, 158 N.Y.S.2d 248, 259–60 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954). 
 74. Veasey, supra note 15, at 445. 
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B. Evolution of the Good-Faith Standard 
The beginning of the good-faith standard can be traced back to the early 
Delaware case Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,75 which was the 
first time that a Delaware court recognized the director’s duty to act in an 
informed and prudent manner.76  In Graham, the plaintiffs could not prove that 
the directors had actual knowledge of wrongdoing or even knowledge of facts 
that should have put them on notice of the occurrence of illegal actions within 
the corporation.77  The plaintiffs, therefore, argued that the directors were 
liable for their failure to take reasonable steps to learn of and prevent the 
activity.78  The court articulated that “[i]f [the director had] recklessly reposed 
confidence in an obviously untrustworthy employee, ha[d] refused or neglected 
cavalierly to perform his duty as a director, or ha[d] ignored either willfully or 
through inattention obvious danger signs of employee wrongdoing, the law 
will cast the burden of liability upon him.”79  The court, however, stopped 
short of imposing a duty upon the board to install a law compliance program 
absent red flags.80  Even though the court did not impose liability in this case, 
Graham heightened the duties expected of directors by requiring them to act in 
a careful and prudent manner.  While this case was groundbreaking, courts did 
not, until recently, embrace the precedent for a heightened standard set forth in 
Graham.81 
Before Aronson v. Lewis,82 a 1984 decision, the expectations of directors 
were unclear, and their legal obligation to the shareholders via their fiduciary 
duties imposed almost no repercussions on them for misconduct.83  In Aronson, 
the Supreme Court of Delaware emphasized the importance of a directorial 
process that requires the board to avail itself of all available information before 
making a decision in good faith, thus affirming the Graham decision.84  The 
court articulated that directors could be held liable for gross negligence for 
 
 75. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
 76. Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business 
Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 985 (1994). 
 77. Graham, 188 A.2d at 127. 
 78. See id. 
 79. Id. at 130. 
 80. See id. at 130–31. 
 81. In fact, before the mid-eighties courts had applied the business judgment rule in a 
manner to completely bar shareholder claims against directors for breaching their fiduciary duty 
of care.  See Horsey, supra note 76, at 977. 
 82. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
 83. Professor George W. Dent, Jr. attributed the decline of enforcement to a 
misunderstanding of the law.  He stated that cases were dismissed under the rule before the court 
even really inquired about whether or not the directors acted reasonably and with due diligence.  
George W. Dent, Jr., The Revolution in Corporate Governance, the Monitoring Board, and the 
Director’s Duty of Care, 61 B.U. L. REV. 623, 647 (1981). 
 84. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
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failing to inform themselves of all material information reasonably available to 
them.85  The significance of the Graham decision had largely been ignored 
until the Aronson court reiterated the enhanced expectations of corporate 
directors.86 
The decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom 87 resolved the issue concerning what 
amount of inquiry would satisfy the informational component of decision 
making.  In Van Gorkom, shareholders brought a derivative suit against the 
board for agreeing to a shareholder-approved merger that would have given the 
shareholders a premium for their shares over the market price at that time.88  
Although shareholders were to receive a price greater than fair market value, 
the court imposed liability on the directors because they made the decision too 
hastily (after only a two-hour meeting), without the appropriate information 
available (they did not read the merger agreement), and without reasonably 
attempting to ask the appropriate questions to get that information (they did not 
try to find out how the agreed price was derived, nor did they hire their own 
expert to give an opinion on an appropriate price).89  Similar to the Aronson 
court, the Van Gorkom court required the directors to have all the information 
reasonably available to them before making the decision.90 
Many scholars at the time attacked the Van Gorkom holding, hailing it as 
the worst decision in corporate history.91  Scholars feared that Van Gorkom 
would lead to a decline in willing and qualified candidates for director 
positions.92  Therefore, in response, many states enacted exculpatory clauses 
that permit stockholders to include a provision in the certificate of 
incorporation that protects directors from personal liability despite a breach of 
fiduciary duty.93 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Horsey, supra note 76, at 986. 
 87. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 88. Id. at 864–70. 
 89. Id. at 868–70. 
 90. Contrast this with ALI principles, which only require directors to be informed to the 
extent that they reasonably believe to be appropriate under the circumstances.  ALI-ABA COURSE 
OF STUDY MATERIALS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: CURRENT AND EMERGING ISSUES § 
4.01(C)(2) (1997). 
 91. See generally Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral 
Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 676 
(2002).  Some feared that the decision would lead to costly and time-consuming procedures that 
would ultimately harm the shareholder, and others agreed with the directors’ conduct and 
believed that it did not even rise to ordinary negligence let alone the requisite gross negligence.  
Many also doubted the utility in analyzing a decision that presented a premium over market price 
that would ultimately be voted on and decided by the shareholders anyway.  See Gevurtz, supra 
note 49, at 299. 
 92. See E. Norman Veasey, Reflections on Key Issues of the Professional Responsibilities of 
Corporate Lawyers in the Twenty-First Century, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 11 (2003). 
 93. See infra notes 125–28 and accompanying text. 
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Nonetheless, following the corporate collapses of the late 1990s, spurred in 
large part by deficient directors and management, the Court of Chancery 
bolstered Graham in its decision in In re Caremark International Inc. 
Derivative Litigation.94  In Caremark, the court noted that even an ill-advised 
decision would be protected assuming it was made from a process that was 
“deliberately considered in good faith or was otherwise rational.”95  In dicta, 
Chancellor Allen reiterated a statement made in Graham, namely that “absent 
cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a 
corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no 
reason to suspect exists.” 96  However, Allen took an extra step, a step the 
Graham court was unwilling to take, and said that Graham could no longer be 
interpreted to mean that a board had no obligation to create an information-
gathering system and monitoring mechanisms to ensure corporate law 
compliance.97  Allen stated that it was necessary for the board to assure itself in 
good faith that information and reporting systems are accurately and promptly 
providing the relevant information for the board to make an informed decision, 
and that if the directors failed to do so they could be held liable for illegal 
conduct.98  However, “only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to 
exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable 
information and reporting system exists—will establish the lack of good faith 
that is a necessary condition to liability.”99  Although this analysis was dictum 
in Caremark, Chief Justice Veasey has noted that the expectations of directors 
have progressed from Graham to Caremark.100  The courts’ progression to 
relying on the principle of good faith is not limited to cases involving fiduciary 
duty, but it also stretches to takeover attempts. 
 
 94. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 95. Id. at 967 (holding that “[d]irector liability for a breach of the duty to exercise 
appropriate attention may . . . follow from a board decision that results in a loss because that 
decision was ill advised or ‘negligent.’” In addition “liability to the corporation for a loss may be 
said to arise from an unconsidered failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due 
attention would, arguably, have prevented the loss.”). 
 96. Id. at 969 (quoting Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963)). 
 97. Id. at 969–70.  But see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2)(iv) (2002), which has been 
adopted by many states and is closer to the Graham interpretation than Caremark.  The section 
states that a director may be held liable for inattention “when particular facts and 
circumstances . . . materialize that” would put “a reasonably attentive director” on notice of the 
need for further inquiry.  See also id. § 8.01 official cmt. (“[D]irectors should not be held 
personally responsible for actions or omissions of officers, employees, or agents of the 
corporation so long as the directors have relied reasonably”). 
 98. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
 99. Id. at 971. 
 100. Veasey, supra note 15, at 446. 
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C. Good Faith in Takeovers 
Although the good-faith standard has become more prominent in the last 
few years, its evolution was also evident in the 1980s and 1990s during the 
hostile takeover phenomenon.101  For example, as a result of that evolution, 
courts apply the business judgment rule to a board’s decision to accept or reject 
a takeover offer, and the board is not obligated to negotiate or to sell the 
company simply because a premium offer has been made.102  Furthermore, 
directors will be exonerated from any challenge if the board makes a good-
faith and informed decision that a sale is not in the company’s best interests.103  
In fact, the board, as a fiduciary, is required to oppose any offer that it feels is 
not in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.104 
Despite the general deference in this area, business judgment rule 
jurisprudence has gradually developed a more rigorous scrutiny of board 
decisions involving defensive actions taken by the board to block a takeover.105  
Courts require this enhanced analysis because of the possibility that a board 
may be acting in its own interest, rather than those of the company and its 
shareholders.106  In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,107  the Delaware 
Supreme Court affirmed the board’s basic duty of ensuring that its decisions 
are in the best interests of the shareholders.108  However, in light of the 
potential conflict of interest, the court imposed a more intrusive two-prong 
test.109  First, the board must have “reasonable grounds for believing that a 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1383 (Del. 1995) 
(holding that the board may deny a “third party’s unsolicited acquisition proposal or offer.” 
(quoting Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 n.13 (Del. 
1994))); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989) 
(holding that the board’s refusal of an offer is a valid decision under its business judgment). 
 103. See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1996) (holding that 
directors are free to decline to negotiate the sale of a company subject to the conditions of good 
faith). 
 104. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985) (holding that “the 
board had both the power and duty to oppose a bid it perceived to be harmful to the corporate 
enterprise.”); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1146 (Del. 1990). 
 105. Fleischer & Sussman, supra note 4, at 921. 
 106. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. 
 107. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 108. Id. at 955. 
 109. Fleischer & Sussman, supra note 4, at 921.  The two-part test in Unocal was later 
rearticulated by the court in Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 
45 (Del. 1994), where the court stated that “[t]he key features of an enhanced scrutiny test are: (a) 
a judicial determination regarding the adequacy of the decision making process . . . including the 
information on which the directors based their decision; and (b) a judicial examination of the 
reasonableness of the directors’ action in light of the circumstances then existing.” 
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danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed.”110  This prong requires 
the board to inform itself fully, and any defensive action taken must be the 
result of careful evaluation of the various alternatives available.111  The board 
also must have responded in good faith to a perceived threat and not for the 
purposes of entrenching itself in office.112  Second, the board must justify the 
reasonableness of the tactics used in response to the threat the takeover posed 
to the corporation’s interests. 113  The board will satisfy the Unocal 
requirements “by showing good faith and reasonable investigation.”114  The 
enhanced scrutiny standard created a mechanism for future litigation involving 
defensive measures employed to resist a corporate takeover. 
The progeny of Unocal continued to hold directors to a heightened 
standard of conduct in regard to takeovers.  In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc.,115 the court developed a modified version of the 
enhanced scrutiny test to deal with the issue of directors who were determined 
to sell the corporation to a new owner.116  The Revlon court noted that if a sale 
of the corporation is inevitable, the director’s duty changes from the 
preservation of the company to the maximization of shareholder value.117  
However, the directors are not always obligated to accept the highest bid, but 
rather to seek out, in good faith, the best transaction that would maximize 
shareholder interest.118 
 
 110. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.  See also Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 
A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 
173, 180 (Del. 1985). Threats sufficient to satisfy the standard include: “coercion, price 
inadequacy, insufficient time or information for shareholders to assess price adequacy, the failure 
to provide shareholders an option to remain equity holders in the corporation, and the effect of a 
change in control upon corporate culture.”  BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 251. 
 111. Fleischer & Sussman, supra note 4, at 921. 
 112. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. 
 113. Id. at 955. The Unocal court mentions Cheff v. Mathes, an early Delaware Supreme 
Court case in which the court did not even give the board the business judgment rule presumption 
of good faith.  Instead, the directors were responsible for proving that they had a reasonable belief 
that the shareholders’ interests were in danger and that their actions did not have the primary 
purpose of self-interest.  This holding, however, proved to have less impact than anticipated 
because liability could only be imposed if self-interest was the board’s only purpose.  STEPHEN 
M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 696 (2002). 
 114. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (quoting Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964)). 
 115. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985). 
 116. Id. at 176. 
 117. See id. at 182.  This duty arises in two situations: 1) when a corporation initiates a 
bidding process to sell itself or reorganize, or 2) when a corporation, in response to an offer, 
abandons its long-term strategy and seeks to break up the company.  Paramount Communications, 
Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989). 
 118. Citron v. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 71 (Del. 1989) (holding 
that the board was properly motivated and acted in good faith in choosing between two bidders). 
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Subsequent cases reiterated the authority of the board in making decisions 
concerning mergers and takeovers.119  In addition, courts repeated the 
deference to these decisions as long as they were made “within a range of 
reasonableness” that included a good-faith analysis of alternatives available to 
the board. 120  In general, the court will not second-guess the board’s judgment 
if the directors’ defensive actions meet the standards discussed.  However, the 
business judgment rule protection is lost if the board breaches one of the triad 
of fiduciary duties121 or does not meet the Unocal or Revlon standards. 
Even if one of these standards is not met, the board’s decision is still not 
necessarily invalidated but will instead be subject to review under the stricter 
entire-fairness test.122  In contrast to the business judgment rule, the entire-
fairness test does not offer directors the benefit of any presumptions.123  
Rather, the board must demonstrate the “utmost good faith” and “scrupulous 
inherent fairness” of the transaction requiring the satisfaction of both fair price 
and fair procedure.124  Recently, courts have made good faith the central 
concept in corporate jurisprudence. 
IV.  RECENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD FAITH 
The court’s determination of a director’s good faith has become central to 
the duty of care and loyalty analyses.  Due to the outcry of concern over the 
potential effect of the enhanced duties expected of directors, many states 
enacted protective provisions.  One such example is section 102(b)(7) of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, which allows shareholders to adopt a 
provision that will exonerate directors from personal liability for violations of 
 
 119. See, e.g., Time Inc., 571 A.2d at 1154 (holding that “Delaware law confers the 
management of the corporate enterprise to the stockholders’ duly elected board 
representatives. . . . [and t]hat duty may not be delegated to the stockholders.”). 
 120. Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1995). 
[T]he ‘range of reasonableness’ standard is a need of the board of directors for latitude in 
discharging its fiduciary duties . . . when defending against perceived threats.  [I]f the 
board of directors’ defensive response is not draconian (preclusive or coercive) and is 
within a ‘range of reasonableness,’ a court must not substitute its judgment for the 
board’s. 
Id. (citing Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45–46 (Del. 
1994)). 
 121. Justice Horsey first observed the triad of fiduciary duties, which refers to the duties of 
care, loyalty, and good faith, in his opinion in Cede & Co.  See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). 
 122. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1221 (Del. 1999); Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 
1377 n.18. 
 123. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (holding that the standard is 
“uncompromising”). 
 124. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).  See also Cede & Co., 634 
A.2d at 361. 
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the duty of care.125  However, if directors fail to act in good faith, they will not 
enjoy the protection of this exculpatory provision and will be subject to 
liability.126  In addition, the good-faith language is prevalent in several other 
important corporate provisions.  Section 141(e) of the Delaware Code allows 
directors to rely in good faith on corporate books, officers, committees, or 
properly chosen experts. 127  Also, directors may not be indemnified under 
section 145 of the Delaware Code if they did not act in good faith. 128  In fact, 
good faith has become the overarching concept in both inquiries of the duties 
of due care and loyalty instead of being subsumed within them.129  A director’s 
failure to exercise good faith would disqualify her from the shelter of the 
protective provisions and the business judgment rule. 
The courts have hinted at corporate governance reform that “mandates that 
directors proactively inform themselves about corporate developments and 
aggressively intervene to understand reported troublesome corporate behavior 
that is not voluntarily brought before the board by management.”130  Vice 
Chancellor Strine observed in an August 2002 article that, due to the recent 
Caremark decision and corporate exculpatory charter provisions, courts will 
focus on a director’s good faith instead of a gross negligence standard.131  In 
fact, the recent trend in director scrutiny has seemingly merged the doctrine of 
good faith and the duty of care because the duty of care presently adds little to 
no practical significance to the directorial role.132 
Due to the prevalent “good faith” language in the Delaware Code that 
would take a director’s conduct outside of these rules’ protection, Delaware 
 
 125. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2002). 
 126. See Veasey, supra note 15, at 447. 
 127. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e). 
 128. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a).  Indemnification refers to the ability of a corporation to 
reimburse a director, officer, employee, or agent for any “expenses (including attorneys’ fees), 
judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement” that were incurred during a suit against her.  Id.  
See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 941–65, for a complete discussion of indemnification 
principles. 
 129. In the comment of § 8.30 of the Model Business Corporation Act, the authors note: 
director[s] shall act in good faith coupled with conduct reasonably believed to be in the 
best interests of the corporation.  This mandate governs all aspects of directors’ duties: the 
duty of care, the duty to become informed, the duty of inquiry, the duty of informed 
judgment, the duty of attention, the duty of loyalty, the duty of fair dealing, and, finally, 
the broad concept of fiduciary duty that the courts often use as a frame of reference when 
evaluating a director’s conduct. 
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: STATUTES, RULES AND FORMS 106 
(Jeffrey D. Bauman ed., 2003 ed.). 
 130. Fleischer & Sussman, supra note 4, at 981. 
 131. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law 
Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW. 1371, 1386 (2002). 
 132. See generally Creighton Condon, Keeping the “Good” Faith: The Evolving Duties—and 
Potential Personal Liability—of Corporate Directors, 7 No. 2 M & A LAW. 1 (June 2003). 
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courts have recently focused on the good faith of the director.  In addition, 
courts have focused on whether directors’ fiduciary duty violations also were 
made in bad faith, which has led to the inquiry of whether directors will be 
held to an independent duty of good faith.133  Courts have also shown that 
these exculpatory provisions will not be upheld in instances in which directors 
“consciously and intentionally disregard[] their responsibilities, adopting a ‘we 
don’t care about the risks’ attitude concerning a material corporate 
decision.”134  Directors who consciously disregard risks or knowingly put their 
heads in the sand to avoid taking action call into question their good faith.135 
Since Aronson, Delaware courts have consistently held directors liable for 
breaching their duty of care when acting in a grossly negligent manner 
described as “a devil-may-care attitude or indifference to a duty amounting to 
recklessness.”136  In recent cases, however, courts have made the distinction 
between “gross negligence amounting to recklessness,” which is a due care 
violation sheltered by the provisions, and “conscious disregard of known 
risks,” or bad faith, which falls outside all of these protective provisions.137  
This distinction is evident in three recent decisions involving derivative actions 
against directors for breaching their fiduciary duties.  In each case, the court 
not only denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, but also precluded the 
102(b)(7) provision, allowing shareholders to proceed with their case. 
A. Recent Cases Utilizing the Good-Faith Standard 
The first example in the recent triad of derivative cases in which the court 
relied on the good-faith standard is McCall v. Scott.138  In McCall, the directors 
knew of schemes instituted by management to improperly increase revenue 
and did nothing to quash the fraud or even discourage it.139  In addition, 
directors even provided incentives for employees to commit fraud, which led 
to lawsuits, loss of goodwill, and declines in stock value due to state and 
federal investigations.140  The Sixth Circuit, applying Delaware law, found that 
the directors’ fiduciary duties included not only due care and loyalty but also 
the duty of good faith.141  The court further asserted that while duty of care 
 
 133. Fleischer & Sussman, supra note 4, at 985. 
 134. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Fleischer & Sussman, supra note 4, at 986 (quoting William T. Allen et. al., Function 
Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. 
LAW. 1287, 1300 (2001)). 
 137. Id. 
 138. 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 139. Id. at 813–15. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 818. 
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claims alleging that only grossly negligent conduct are precluded by the 
102(b)(7) waiver provision, claims based on reckless or intentional misconduct 
are not protected.142  The court found that if directors consciously disregarded 
known risks, there would be a likelihood of liability for breach of fiduciary 
duty.143  Furthermore, the duty of good faith may be breached where 
stockholders suffer due to a director’s conscious disregard of known risks 
because such actions cannot be made in good faith.144 
Another example is In re Abbot Laboratories Derivative Shareholders 
Litigation.145  In Abbot, the directors, over a six-year period, failed to fix safety 
violations despite thirteen FDA inspections of its facilities that resulted in 
continual notices of the problems being sent to the directors.146  The plaintiffs 
presented facts that the directors were aware of the problems and took no 
action to remedy them, leading to the largest civil fine ever imposed by the 
FDA and the suspension of the company’s products.147  The Seventh Circuit, 
following the reasoning in McCall, stated that a complaint, which sufficiently 
pleads facts of bad faith by the directors, falls outside of an exculpatory 
provision’s protection.148  Therefore, the court ruled against the directors 
because their failure to act exhibited a lack of good faith.149 
The most recent illustration, In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation,150 
is a May 2003 decision in the Delaware Court of Chancery.  The CEO of 
Disney, Michael Eisner, hired Michael Ovitz, a longtime personal friend, to 
become the company’s new president.151  In approving the appointment, the 
board’s conduct was inappropriate for several reasons, including the fact that 
the board met for less than an hour (and spent most of its time on two other 
issues), relied on a summary of the employee agreement’s terms (which had 
not been finalized at the time of the board’s meeting), and did not consult an 
expert for advice on the compensation arrangement.152  In essence, the board 
gave the CEO free reign to negotiate at will with a close friend without any 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 818 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 144. See id. 
 145. 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 146. Id. at 799–801. 
 147. Id. at 809. 
 148. Id. at 811. 
 149. Id.  The court reasoned that a “sustained and systematic failure of the board to exercise 
oversight,” in this case intentional in that the directors knew of the violations of law, took no 
steps in an effort to prevent or remedy the situation, and that failure to take any action for 
such an inordinate amount of time resulted in substantial corporate losses, establishing a lack 
of good faith. 
Id. at 809. 
 150. 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 151. Id. at 279. 
 152. Id. at 279–85. 
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board scrutiny.  In addition, after Eisner admitted that hiring Ovitz was a 
mistake, he unilaterally negotiated a severance package worth $140 million 
without the participation of the board.153  The board also failed in this 
transaction because it did not insist on the use of an impartial attorney who 
would have advised the board that it could seek a termination based on fault, 
which would have saved Disney the exorbitant “pay-off” to Ovitz.154 
The Disney court again focused on whether or not the board’s actions were 
honest and made in good faith.  At issue in Disney was executive 
compensation, a matter that courts historically have refused to second-guess.  
There is no bright-line dollar limit to executive compensation, and as 
Chancellor Chandler noted “large, heavy ships can float.”155  In a recent article, 
however, Chief Justice Veasey pointed out that there are limits that revolve 
around the processes the board incorporates in coming to a decision and the 
board’s good faith, which “requires an honesty of purpose and eschews a 
disingenuous mindset of appearing or claiming to act for the corporate good, 
but not caring for the well-being of the constituents of the fiduciary.”156  
Veasey further stated that reckless or irresponsible conduct could lack good 
faith even absent self-dealing or fraudulent conduct.157 
The Disney court also noted that an exculpatory provision eliminating or 
limiting liability did not apply to either a breach of the director’s duty of 
loyalty to stockholders or acts or omissions not made in good faith or that 
entail intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of the law.158  Even 
though the court was reluctant to second-guess the decisions of independent 
directors, “the facts belie[d] any assertion that [the Disney directors] exercised 
any business judgment or made any good faith attempt to fulfill the fiduciary 
duties they owed to Disney and its shareholders.”159  Essentially, the directors 
“consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a 
‘we don’t care about the risks’ attitude.”160  The court concluded that the 
directors were deliberately indifferent to acting in good faith and with 
 
 153. Id. at 283–85. 
 154. Id  at 286–88. 
 155. Veasey, supra note 15, at 447 (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 
342, 350 (Del. Ch. 1998)). 
 156. E. Norman Veasey, Corporate Governance and Ethics in the Post-Enron WorldCom 
Environment, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 850–51 (2003). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Walt Disney Co., 825 A.2d at 286. 
 159. Id. at 287. 
 160. Id. at 289.  See also Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., 
Inc. v. Elkins, No. Civ.A. 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290, at *9, *12 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004).  
The Elkins court used the Disney standard and denied several of the directors’ motions to dismiss 
due to the fact that there was sufficient evidence that they entered into several agreements in 
“blind faith”; therefore, their conduct was not in good faith and was not protected by exculpatory 
provisions.  Id. at *12, *15. 
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appropriate care to advance corporate interests, thereby placing their conduct 
outside the business judgment rule’s reach.161 
The court also concluded that the facts supported an inference that Ovitz’s 
negotiations of his employment and termination agreements breached his duty 
of loyalty.  While the court acknowledged his right to seek the best agreement 
possible for himself, he had the duty of negotiating honestly and with good 
faith so that he would not be advantaged at the shareholders’ expense.162 
Disney, along with Abbot and McCall, makes it clear that intentional and 
reckless conduct showing a disregard for obvious risks constitutes bad faith 
and will not be protected by the business judgment rule or exculpatory 
provisions.  This new focus on directors’ good faith is a step in the right 
direction to provide a tangible standard that directors can use as a model for 
their own conduct. 
V.  GOOD FAITH: THE UTILITY IN A BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE ANALYSIS AND 
PROMOTION OF BUSINESS 
The focus on a director’s good faith provides a more comprehensible and 
precise standard of review for courts to follow.  The courts have been 
inconsistent with their articulation of the exact standard of conduct that is 
expected of directors.  Many courts continue to look to Delaware for guidance 
because Delaware incorporates the majority of corporations in America.  
However, even Delaware has not provided a consistent definition for the 
standard of care that will subject directors to liability.  Over time, the standard 
has gone through an array of principles including: “gross and palpable 
overreaching,” “bad faith . . . or a gross abuse of discretion,” gross negligence, 
fraud, misconduct or abuse of discretion, and “reckless indifference to or a 
deliberate disregard of the stockholders.”163  In addition, the review of whether 
a decision was made in bad faith was limited to those decisions that seem so 
far beyond reasonable judgment that they were “inexplicable on any ground 
other than bad faith.”164 
The recent focus on good faith simplifies the articulation of a director’s 
fiduciary duties by merging the duties of care and loyalty.  The business 
judgment rule limits a director’s liability assuming she was disinterested and 
 
 161. Walt Disney Co., 825 A.2d at 289. 
 162. Id. at 291. 
 163. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted). 
 164. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 37 (quoting In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 
542 A.2d 770, 780–81 (Del. Ch. 1988)). See, e.g., Muschel v. W. Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904, 908 
(Del. Ch. 1973) (holding that a gross disparity in price paid and a fair price for the stock of an 
acquired corporation could be construed as beyond an error of judgment and arising to bad faith); 
Aronoff v. Albanese, 446 N.Y.S.2d 368, 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (holding that a great 
disparity in the value of assets given in comparison to the benefits the company received signals 
bad faith). 
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made an informed decision in good faith.165  One commentator broke down the 
duty of good faith into three substantive elements.166  First, the director must 
be disinterested in the transaction by “neither appear[ing] on both sides of the 
transaction nor expect[ing] to derive any personal benefit from it in the sense 
of self-dealing.”167  Second, the director must be independent and not 
dominated by another person.168  The director is considered independent if she 
can make her decision “based on the corporate merits of the subject before the 
board rather than extraneous considerations or influences.”169  If the director 
cannot exercise free judgment or is influenced by an interested party, she 
cannot possibly act in good faith.170  Finally, the conduct cannot be 
“egregious,” which is a decision made “that . . . no person of sound ordinary 
business judgment would countenance.”171  As Chancellor Allen has observed, 
the rare case that looks at the irrationality of a decision is really a way of 
analyzing bad faith.172 
Consistent with the purpose of the business judgment rule, the focus on a 
director’s good faith gives deference to business decisions.  The overall 
premise of the business judgment rule is that, absent the egregious case of bad 
judgment or when there is evidence of bad faith, courts will not second-guess 
the soundness of business decisions.173  This idea is important because 
exposing director decisions to any additional scrutiny would have a negative 
effect on business as a whole.  Directors would be inclined to be risk-averse 
and constantly second-guess their own judgment if they knew that each 
judgment could be unfairly scrutinized.  Any judicial allowance for review 
would upset the system of free enterprise and bold entrepreneurial spirit, which 
has become the cornerstone of American business.  Furthermore, judges are 
not trained to make such decisions and have no place in reviewing business 
 
 165. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 3. 
 166. Charles Hansen, The ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due Care and 
the Business Judgment Rule, A Commentary, 41 BUS. LAW. 1237, 1248 (1986). 
 167. Id. at 1248 (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812). 
 168. Id. at 1249. 
 169. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816 (holding that the business judgment rule will still insulate the 
board’s decision from judicial review unless the plaintiff can show that a majority of the board 
was interested and/or lacked independence.  In order to prove the directors were not independent, 
the plaintiff must establish personal or business relationships by which the directors are either 
beholden to or controlled by the interested party). 
 170. Hansen, supra note 166, at 1249. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See Parnes v. Bally Entm’t Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999) (holding that “[t]he 
presumptive validity of a business judgment is rebutted in those rare cases where the decision 
under attack is ‘so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially 
inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.’” (quoting In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 542 
A.2d 770, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 1988))). 
 173. See Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp., 140 A. 264, 268 (Del. 1927). 
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decisions as a whole, no matter how foolish the decision may appear in 
hindsight. 
The concentration on a director’s good faith eliminates the need for the 
subjective determination of what conduct constitutes gross negligence in the 
context of a duty of care inquiry.  Corporate exculpatory provisions will 
absolve a director of any liability, even if her conduct is grossly negligent, as 
long as her good faith is uncompromised.174  Therefore, in practice the only 
worthwhile inquiry in the context of a director’s duty of care is into the 
director’s good faith.  The oft-cited duty of care requirement, which mandates 
that a director exercise the “amount of care which ordinarily careful and 
prudent men would use in similar circumstances,” is misleading.175  The search 
for directors who have been held liable for “negligence uncomplicated by self-
dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very large 
haystack.”176 
In the decision-making context, the final result of a decision is not the 
focus of a court’s analysis, and therefore, there is no need for a court to inquire 
into whether a decision was one of “an ordinarily prudent person . . . in a like 
position and under similar circumstances.”177  Rather, the process is the key 
component, and a good faith undertaking by the directors is required.178  If a 
lack of good faith yields an egregious result, the directors will not meet the 
standards set forth by the business judgment rule.179 
A case illustrative of a board decision in which the process was so foolish 
that even the business judgment rule did not insulate it is Litwin v. Allen.180  
The court held the directors of Guaranty Trust Company liable for the decision 
to purchase $3 million of debentures.181  The purchase agreement gave the 
seller the option to repurchase the debentures at the sale price within six 
months.182  This option put the risk of loss on Guaranty Trust if the debentures 
declined, which they did.183  In addition, Guaranty Trust did not realize any 
potential for profiting because if the debentures appreciated, the seller could 
exercise the option to repurchase.184  Therefore, the situation was a no-win for 
Guaranty Trust.  The court noted that while the director’s honesty was 
unquestioned, honesty was not enough: “[T]here must be diligence, and that 
 
 174. McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 818 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 175. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 113, at 242–43. 
 176. Hansen, supra note 166, at 1245. 
 177. Id. at 1246 (citation omitted). 
 178. Id. at 1248. 
 179. See Veasey, supra note 15, at 447. 
 180. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940). 
 181. See id. at 699–701. 
 182. Id. at 691. 
 183. Id. at 697–98. 
 184. Id. at 698. 
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means care and prudence, as well.”185  Some processes that yield a decision 
may be so foolish that even the business judgment rule will not protect the 
directors from judicial review; however, these cases are extremely rare.186  
Nonetheless, Litwin stands as precedent for the idea that directors will be held 
liable for making decisions that are beyond a range of reasonableness and that 
are so egregious their good faith is compromised.187 
Even out of the decision-making context, directors are only held liable for 
obvious failures to exercise any oversight and supervision.188  A typical 
example is Francis v. United Jersey Bank.189  In Francis, the director allowed 
her two sons to use the company to make unlawful payments to themselves.190  
The court found her liable because she exercised no attention at all to the 
affairs of the corporation.191  The court stated that directors have a constant 
obligation to inform themselves about the activities of the corporation and 
must not ignore corporate misconduct only to claim that because they did not 
see the misconduct, they did not have a duty to look.192  Again, the precedent 
set forth by Francis has a minimal reach that extends only to those directors 
who remain oblivious to their duties and simply exercise no oversight. 
The court should be cautious and broadly construe the good-faith standard 
in favor of the director because it is not the job of the court to second-guess 
business decisions, especially with the aid of hindsight.  Shareholders are quick 
to question the soundness of a business decision after the market tests its 
utility; however, the good-faith standard should not be used to heighten the 
degree of scrutiny for business decisions not complicated by conflicts of 
interest.  The heightened scrutiny of Unocal and its progeny, along with the 
entire-fairness test articulated in Weinberger, are undoubtedly necessary in 
transactions involving conflicts of interest; however, such a rigid standard has 
no place in evaluating the conduct of good-intentioned and disinterested 
directors.  The good-faith standard can have a marked impact in corporate 
jurisprudence and the corporate culture as a whole if used appropriately. 
 
 185. Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 699 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).  The court held in this case 
that there was more than a “question of business judgment as to which men might well differ.  
The directors plainly failed in this instance to bestow the care which the situation demanded.”  Id. 
 186. See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051–52 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“There is 
a theoretical exception . . . that some decisions may be so ‘egregious’ that liability for losses they 
cause may follow even in the absence of proof of conflict of interest or improper motivation.  The 
exception, however, has resulted in no awards of money judgments . . . .”). 
 187. See Hansen, supra note 166, at 1249. 
 188. Id. at 1247. 
 189. 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981). 
 190. See id. at 818–19. 
 191. See id. at 819–20. 
 192. Id. at 823. 
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VI.  WHERE CAN THE GOOD-FAITH ANALYSIS BE USED AND WHAT IS ITS 
FUTURE IMPACT ON THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE? 
The evolving standard of good faith will likely change the expectations of 
the corporate culture.  In the wake of Enron and other prominent corporate 
catastrophes, the focus on a director’s good faith is a necessary component of a 
court’s analysis.  Good faith likely will become the central concept in the 
judicial review of suits against directors for breach of their fiduciary duties.  A 
lack of good faith brings their conduct outside of both the business judgment 
presumption and the protective provisions adopted by many states limiting the 
director’s exposure to liability but still requiring that their actions be made in 
good faith. 
Although this Comment’s main focus is not on recent legislation, the 
evolution of the good-faith concept can also be seen in several recently 
adopted acts.  These acts are a response to the lamentable behavior of many 
directors who have been the subject of much controversy in the past few 
years.193  Veasey noted “the utter failure to follow the minimum expectations 
of the evolving standards of director conduct, the minimum expectations of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, or the NYSE or NASDAQ Rules . . . might . . . raise a good 
faith issue.”194  In addition, Veasey has observed that these requirements have 
likely “enhanced the expectations of minimal director conduct.”195  It is the 
role of the board to ensure all of the enhanced mandated “corporate 
governance principles are carried out and followed through in good faith.”196  
Overall, the heightened scrutiny on director conduct is likely to have a marked 
impact in several areas, including: decreasing the pool of qualified candidates 
for director positions, increasing litigation against current officials, restraining 
 
 193. Veasey, supra note 5, at 2138. 
 194. Veasey, supra note 15, at 446. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act holds directors to a heightened 
degree of censure, oversight, and qualifications.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
204, § 101(c)–(e), 116 Stat. 745, 750–52 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 
29 U.S.C.A.).  The Board must have five financially literate members, and all of the members 
must serve the corporation on a full time basis.  § 101(e)(1), (3).  This requirement ensures that 
the directors have an intimate knowledge of the corporation’s dealings and any potential warning 
signs.  The Act also outlines several expectations now required of boards: 1) it must register 
public accounting firms, 2) establish or adopt “auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and 
other standards relating to the preparation of audit reports for issuers,” 3) conduct inspections of 
accounting firms, 4) conduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings, and impose appropriate 
sanctions, 5) perform such other duties or functions as necessary, 6) “enforce compliance with 
[the] Act, the rules of the Board, professional standards, and the securities laws relating to the 
preparation and issuance of audit reports and the obligations and liabilities of accountants with 
respect thereto,” and 7) “set the budget and manage the operations of the Board and the staff of 
the Board.”  § 101(c). 
 195. Veasey, supra note 5, at 2145. 
 196. Id. at 2146. 
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exorbitant compensation agreements to top executives, and proving a 
formidable action in the upcoming litigation of many of corporate scandals. 
A. Decrease in the Pool of Qualified Candidates for Directorial Positions 
The focus on the concept of good faith in the context of fiduciary duty 
coupled with the newly enacted measures from Congress and the self-
regulatory organizations is likely to shrink the pool of qualified candidates 
willing to serve on corporate boards.197  In addition, even those directors who 
still desire to serve on corporate boards will be limited in the number of boards 
they can adequately and effectively serve on due to the increased time 
demands on boards to focus on “accountability mechanisms related to 
compensation, crisis management, accounting and auditing issues.”198  These 
initiatives increase the responsibilities of directors and heighten the degree of 
care expected of them.  Therefore, many candidates will likely shy away from 
taking on these duties. Hopefully the willing candidates that do fill these 
positions will fulfill their duties responsibly and productively so that the 
market will regain its faith in corporations. 
Board members are usually well-educated and extremely sophisticated 
individuals and expect to be compensated as such.  The problem is that 
sophistication and knowledge are useless if board members do not attend 
meetings and do not care enough about the company to prod into the daily 
occurrences in order to make decisions that will improve the company.  The 
recent corporate scandals, most notably Enron,199 provide a comprehensive 
template on what directors should not do.  The highly publicized corporate 
scandals of Enron, WorldCom, and others led to public outrage and corporate 
governance reform, which inspired a host of emerging new requirements from 
legislators, regulators, and the stock exchanges.  The boards now face 
unprecedented scrutiny, increased risks and responsibilities, and tough new 
standards for their skills and independence. 
 
 197. Veasey, supra note 15, at 448. 
 198. Jerri Stroud, Boardroom Activism Drives Up Director Pay, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Aug. 8, 2004, at E4 (quoting Joel Seligman, Dean of Washington University School of Law). 
 199. Many of Enron’s board members missed a majority of the board meetings.  Marianne M. 
Jennings, Restoring Ethical  Gumption  in the Corporation: A Federalist Paper on Corporate 
Governance—Restoration of Active Virtue in the Corporate Structure to Curb the “Yeehaw 
Culture” in Organizations, 3 WYO. L. REV. 387, 403 (2003).  In addition, the board’s function 
became one of merely putting its stamp of approval on transactions without making any inquiry 
despite being warned about a transactions’ high risk.  Id. at 405.  Such incidents include: the 
February 1999 audit committee meeting in which the board was told Enron’s accounting methods 
pushed the limits of legally accepted methods, meetings between 1999–2001, in which the board 
was told gross revenues were doubling and tripling, generated by off-the-book entities run by 
their CFO, the board’s continual waiver of its own conflict of interest policy to run more off-the-
book entities, and the fact that it accepted management’s word that a whistle-blower memo was 
nothing and dismissed it with no investigation.  Id. at 404–05. 
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Enron board members averaged $380,000 in total cash and equity 
compensation each year.200  This amount did not even include the money they 
were paid for attending meetings during the year,201 nor did it include the 
money board members made through indirect channels.202  The public became 
outraged at such ludicrous numbers when the scandals were brought into the 
limelight.  However, even today the average corporate director at a large 
corporation in the United States receives $154,016 per year in compensation 
for her services.203  In comparison to Enron’s figures this amount may not 
seem absurd, but compared to an average employee’s salary this figure is still 
quite high, especially when one considers the fact that a director’s duties only 
consist of a few days of work per year. 
Directors’ salaries are also expected to double or triple in the next ten years 
due to the fact that serving on a board has become a larger time 
commitment.204  Therefore, there are still significant incentives for qualified 
candidates to accept director positions; however, it is clear that more is 
expected of them than the directorial inattention evident in the recent corporate 
scandals.  As one corporate director acknowledged: “It’s very serious 
business,” and finally directors “are paying attention to what they should have 
been paying attention to all along.”205  Those boards that did not pay attention 
to fraudulent conduct and the corporate officials responsible for such dishonest 
conduct will now face increased scrutiny and a heightened exposure to 
discipline. 
 
 200. Reed Abelson, Enron Board Comes Under a Storm of Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
2001, § 3, at 4. 
 201. Jennings, supra note 199, at 403. 
 202. Douglas M. Branson, Enron — When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or 
Roadmap to Corporate Governance Reform?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 989, 1019 (2003).  Enron 
conducted many transactions involving conflicts of interest with its board members.  Id.  Such 
incidents include: paying Lord John Wakeham, a chartered accountant, $72,000 per year for 
consulting services; hiring Board member John Urquhart and his Connecticut based consulting 
firm for $493,914 in 2000; giving $70,000 to Board member Charls Walker, a tax lobbyist, which 
was paid to firms he controlled; buying equipment from National Tank Company, whose director 
Herbert Winokur also served in the years 1997-2000; donating $50,000 to George Mason 
University and its Mercatus Center headed by board member Dr. Wendy Gramm; and 
contributing more than $600,000 to the Andersen Cancer Center, over which two Enron board 
members, Dr. Charles LeMaistre and Dr. John Mendelson, had at various time presided as 
president.  Id. 
 203. Press Release, Pearl Meyer & Partners, Calm Before the Storm — Average Board Pay at 
Largest 200 Companies Stays Flat at $154K (Mar. 27, 2003), at http://www.pearlmeyer.com/ 
prcurart35.html. 
 204. See Stroud, supra note 198 (opinion of Todd McGovern, regional compensation leader 
with Mellon Financial Corp. of Pittsburgh). 
 205. Id.  Gwendolyn King, director of Monsanto Co. and three other companies, opined about 
the role of corporate directors in today’s corporate culture.  Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
598 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:571 
B. Increase in Litigation Against Current Officials 
Courts are opening the door for increased litigation against directors and 
officers, and corporate lawyers are likely to accept the challenge of 
representing shareholders who lose assets as a result of dishonest corporate 
conduct.  Likely, the focus of litigation against corporate directors will 
concentrate on inadequate oversight.206  The courts have made it clear that 
exculpatory provisions will not protect directors’ conduct if it was so egregious 
that it lacked good faith and was contrary to the best interests of the 
shareholder.207  In addition, Delaware enacted new legislation that makes it 
easier for stockholders to obtain books and records of the corporation if they 
have a proper interest in obtaining information on the corporation’s 
operations.208  This provision will make it easier for shareholders to examine 
the exact steps and processes taken by the board in making decisions that 
impact the corporation.  An increase in the availability of information further 
bolsters the recommendation to directors that they ensure the installation of 
appropriate information systems in the company and avail themselves of all 
possible information before making a decision in the company’s best interests. 
Another possible impact of the recent focus on good faith is an increase in 
litigation pursuing officers in fraud cases.209  Perhaps as a direct response to 
the appalling conduct of many top officials, Delaware recently enacted 
legislation that would subject officers to the personal jurisdiction of the Court 
of Chancery in the same manner as directors.210  Therefore, stockholders will 
likely have a cause of action against top officials involved in fraudulent 
schemes or wasting company assets.  In response, top officials should be 
concerned with ensuring that their conduct can survive good-faith scrutiny. 
Insurance carriers may also disclaim coverage due to the recent focus by 
some courts upon the exclusions for willful or intentional misconduct.211  
Corporations and directors protect themselves from personal liability through 
such coverage; however, actions made in bad faith will likely not be protected.  
Boards failing to meet these minimal requirements will likely be forced to pay 
for their indiscretions out of their own pocket instead of relying on 
indemnification or insurance.  In fact, the move toward holding inept directors 
personally responsible for failing to exercise the requisite care in their decision 
making has recently become a reality as former directors of both Enron and 
 
 206. Veasey, supra note 5, at 2145. 
 207. See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text. 
 208. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2003). 
 209. Veasey, supra note 15, at 448. 
 210. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (2003). 
 211. Fleischer & Sussman, supra note 4, at 983.  Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance 
reimburses the corporation for any indemnification payment made to an officer or director and 
also covers the officials in situations where the corporation does not offer indemnification.  
BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 941. 
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WorldCom agreed to personally compensate shareholders for losses incurred 
as a result of their failure to monitor the illegal activity within the 
corporation.212  These settlements are “highly unusual” and reiterate the 
premise that a director must carry out her duties with the utmost 
professionalism and good faith or face exposure to potential personal 
liability.213 The scrutiny on officials’ good faith could also spill over from the 
area of decision making and into the relatively untouched area of executive 
compensation. 
C. Executive Compensation Agreements 
The good-faith standard could have a substantial influence on litigation 
involving executive compensation.  The corporate culture saw a huge increase 
in executive compensation in the 1990s, and the insatiable greed for lavish 
indulgences permeated it at levels never before seen.  Few questioned the 
exorbitant payments being made to executives during the economic boom 
because everyone was prospering; however, when the bubble burst, the lofty 
salaries became an issue. 
Many of Wall Street’s brightest stars such as Kenneth Lay of Enron, 
Dennis Kozlowski of Tyco, and Bernhard Ebbers of WorldCom, who made 
millions of dollars throughout the 1990s, plummeted back to reality as their 
companies’ stocks crashed and their own names became headline news in 
ongoing fraud investigations.214  Today, the public even views such prominent 
executives such as Jack Welch of General Electric as “greedy robber barons” 
despite the fact that it was only a few years ago that the market hailed them as 
“entrepreneurial geniuses.”215  As shareholder wealth quickly disintegrated in 
the bear market of 2000-02, the question of why these executives made so 
much money was on everyone’s mind. 
Recently, three corporate law scholars, Professor Lucien Bebchuk, 
Professor Jesse Fried, and David Walker, attempted to answer the question that 
so often came up in conversation.216  Their article theorizes that top officials 
are so highly compensated because they exert so much control over their 
companies and the boards of directors that they can siphon money to 
 
 212. Greg Farrell, Ex-Directors Could Pay Out of Own Pockets: Move in WorldCom Suit 
Unusual, USA TODAY, January 7, 2005, at 3B; Matt Krantz & Greg Farrell, Ex-Enron Officials 
OK $168M Payment: 10 Ex-Directors to Contribute $13M, USA TODAY, January 10, 2005, at 
6B. 
 213. Farrell, Ex-Directors Could Pay Out of Own Pockets, supra note 212. 
 214. Franklin G. Snyder, More Pieces of the CEO Compensation Puzzle, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
129, 130–31 (2003). 
 215. Id. at 131. 
 216. Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002). 
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themselves almost at will.217  Such a powerful and improper influence allows 
the officials to dictate the terms of their own compensation, which will be the 
highest amount they can take without triggering what the authors call public 
“outrage.”218  In addition, the top officials will engage in “camouflage” to 
conceal large payments from investors and minimize the possibility of causing 
such an outrage.219 
An example of camouflage includes stock options that tie executive 
compensation to the company’s stock price but do not take any money directly 
from the company.220  Instead, the executive is compensated by exercising her 
options at well below the market price and profiting from the spread between 
the prices.  Such tactics led to several top officials looting their companies by 
posting artificial profits and assets to keep the stock price up long enough for 
them to sell their shares on the open market and make a significant profit just 
before the stock plummeted.221  In fact, it seems that performance has little, if 
anything, to do with how much money an executive can make in a year, which 
is why even in the bear market many corporate officials were receiving 
exorbitant paychecks.  The economist John Kenneth Galbraith pointed out 
“[t]he salary of the chief executive of the large corporation is not a market 
reward for achievement,” but rather “a warm personal gesture by the individual 
to himself.”222 
The recent corporate scandals seemed to affirm the very premises that 
these scholars had previously written about, and such foresight is not due to the 
novelty of the thesis. The authors themselves point out that there is nothing 
new to the ideas that many top officials are greedy, that they are not effectively 
controlled by their boards, and that they overpay themselves for the services 
they provide.  Even in the wake of all the corporate scandals, in 2004 the 
average CEO still received more than $9 million in compensation.223 
There is a belief in the corporate culture that there is no limit to what 
compensation committees can give top executives because it is nearly 
impossible to judge the exact dollar value that a top executive has to the 
 
 217. See id. at 754–56. 
 218. See id. at 756. 
 219. See id. 
 220. See id. at 762–63. 
 221. Margaret M. Blair, Directors’ Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language Matters, 38 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 885, 889 (2003). 
 222. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, ANNALS OF AN ABIDING LIBERAL 79 (Andrea D. Williams 
ed., 1979). 
 223. CNNMoney, Report: More Cash for CEOs (April 4, 2004), at http://money.cnn.com/ 
2004/04/04/news/fortune500/ceo_pay/.  According to the survey conducted by Pearl Meyer & 
Partners, this figure is actually down eight percent from 2003.  Id. 
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company’s overall performance.224  There is no statutory limitation or certain 
dollar amount that is too high; however, judicial review will likely focus on the 
board processes for figuring compensation, which are governed by a duty of 
good faith.225  This principle has been proven in the recent Disney case, which 
is still ongoing in the Delaware Court of Chancery.  It is possible that directors 
could be held liable for approving a compensation agreement without first 
taking appropriate measures to consider whether the agreement is in the best 
interests of the corporation.  The board should consult comparable officer’s 
salaries and experts to determine what would be a fair agreement between the 
corporation and the executive candidate.  Failure to employ such methods 
could call the board’s good faith into question. 
The shareholder can also attack the terms of an executive compensation 
arrangement on the grounds that it is so unfavorable to the corporation that no 
director of ordinary sound business judgment would have voted in favor of it, 
and it is therefore a waste of corporate assets.226  If reasonable persons could 
differ as to whether a compensation agreement is favorable to the corporation, 
it will generally be upheld under the business judgment rule.227  Again, the 
good faith of the decision is an integral component of this analysis because “if 
there [was] a good faith judgment that in the circumstances the transaction 
[was] worthwhile, there should be no finding of waste.”228  Disney involves a 
claim for waste of corporate assets due to the large sums of money paid to 
Ovitz for which the corporation received little if any benefit.229  If the Disney 
board is held liable in this case, it would set a precedent that future boards need 
to scrutinize the stipulations of executive compensation agreements and ensure 
their fairness. 
Thirty years ago a corporate insider wrote: 
While ostensibly the seat of all power and responsibility, directors are 
usually the friends of the chief executive put there to keep him safely in 
office. They meet once a month, gaze at the financial window 
dressing . . .  listen to the chief and his team talk superficially about the 
state of the operation, ask a couple of dutiful questions, . . . and adjourn 
until next month.230 
Hopefully, the focus on a director’s good faith along with the newly proposed 
acts will spawn a resurgence of ethical conduct in corporations, and boards will 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
602 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:571 
assume the duty of maximizing shareholder value, which is supposed to be 
their primary concern.  While the standard of good faith’s long-term impact on 
executive compensation is unknown, these new initiatives should prove 
influential in the upcoming litigation of the corporate scandals. 
D. Litigation Involving Corporate Scandals 
The good-faith analysis could prove to be instrumental in the upcoming 
litigation of the economic disasters of Enron, WorldCom, and others.  In 
WorldCom, for example, the Thornburgh Report231 alleges that WorldCom 
used fraudulent accounting to cover up financial problems and failed to 
monitor or influence the actions of management.232  The board members 
apparently continually approved actions with little or no inquiry into their 
potential impact on the corporation.233  Therefore, their primary goal was to 
please industry analysts by meeting or beating earnings estimates, which 
caused a rise in stock price.234  Similarly, the Powers Report235 alleges that 
Enron was managed toward the market expectations in an attempt to take 
advantage of short-term profits.236  In addition, Enron allegedly met its 
earnings estimates by using an elaborate business scheme wrought with 
conflicts of interest and potential fraudulent conduct.237  The common thread in 
both of these debacles, and likely others, is that officers abused the 
corporation’s assets and directors were content to watch and allow it to 
happen.238  As recent cases have shown, such conduct is not appropriate and 
could subject directors to liability.  In addition, with the enactment of new 
provisions geared at officials, greed-driven management could also be subject 
to similar censure. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
While the good-faith analysis does impose a heightened level of directorial 
conduct, it is important to note that the requirements are not unreasonable.  The 
judicial review in this area is not intended to minimize risk-taking or to raise 
individuals’ concerns over the increased liability exposure.  The business 
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judgment rule remains unchanged and remains a formidable barrier protecting 
directors’ decisions from second-guessing by the courts even for gross 
negligence or recklessness where their wrongdoing is unwitting or 
unintentional.  The court’s job is to analyze the processes incorporated by the 
directors in their decision making and oversight duties.239  This is the area in 
which the expectations of directors have consistently evolved, and presently 
the focus is on the good faith of the board in initiating appropriate processes.240 
The good faith concept is an essential component in director conduct and 
must be considered when analyzing directors’ processes and motivations to 
ensure they are “honest and are not disingenuous or reckless.”241  The concept 
of good faith is not fully developed in case law; however, it is clear that 
“reckless, disingenuous, irresponsible, or irrational conduct . . . [can] implicate 
concepts of good faith.”242  The recent decisions in McCall, Abbott, and Disney 
represent egregious breakdowns in board review and inaction to issues of 
which the board was aware. 
The newly proposed provisions enacted by Congress and self-regulatory 
organizations coupled with the new focus of good faith in the fiduciary duties 
of both officers and directors will hopefully improve the current state of 
corporate ethics.  There are also commentators who have made 
recommendations for improving the ethical situation of corporate governance.  
The Principles of Corporate Governance adopted by the Business 
Roundtable243 in May 2002 and the recommendations of the ABA Task Force 
on Corporate Responsibility244 are key guides for the aspirations of corporate 
governance. The heightened standards only impose a duty to exercise good-
faith judgment in business decision making. 
[I]ndependent directors who exercise skepticism, diligence and a willingness to 
ask tough questions, to insist that management present to the board (or an 
appropriate committee) matters of potential materiality to the corporation, who 
fully inform themselves with respect to matters presented to the board 
(including decisions not to act), and who seek the advice of independent 
experts (including executive compensation experts) when it is appropriate to 
do so, should continue to enjoy all the protections afforded by the business 
judgment rule and exculpatory clauses.245 
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Courts have made it clear, however, that directors will be held liable for a lack 
of good faith where they consciously or intentionally disregard their duties.246 
The potential difficulty for directors is the manner in which judges and 
juries may evaluate their conduct in the context of good faith given the 
imprecise and subjective boundary between good faith and bad faith.247  
Therefore, caution is left to the courts to only impose liability in cases 
involving obviously egregious or illegal conduct.  Courts should not impose a 
rigid standard on disinterested decisions because the effect upon the corporate 
culture would be negative, leaving unqualified and risk-averse individuals in 
positions that demand bold risk-takers.  Recent corporate greed forced a shift 
within the court systems to hand down harsher punishments for improper 
conduct; however, heed should be taken to ensure the pendulum does not shift 
too far in the other direction or the results could be equally disastrous. 
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